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# Advance on Sin-ho and Capture of Tang-ku.
## DESPATCH from Sir HOPE GRANT to Mr. Secretary HERBERT.
(No. 37.)
SIR,
Head Quarters, Tang-ku,* August 24, 1860.
I HAVE the honour to report that the Allied Forces were unable to leave Peh-tang until the 12th August, on account of the very heavy rain, which had made the country almost impassable.
On that morning, however, the troops marched according to the following dispositions, viz., the 2d Division of Infantry, an Armstrong Battery, a Rocket Battery, Madras Sappers, and the Cavalry Brigade, with three 6-pounders. The whole under Major-General Sir Robert Napier struck off to the right of the road leading from Peh-tang to Sin-ho, for the purpose of turning the left of the Tartar position. This column experienced the greatest difficulty in getting through the deep heavy ground, which extended for more than two miles out of Peh-tang, and considerably delayed the departure of the main column, under Sir John Michel, which moved along the causeway leading directly from Peh-tang to Sin-ho, and which was composed as follows, viz., the 1st Infantry Brigade, a company of Royal Engineers, an Armstrong Battery, 1,000 French Infantry, and a French Battery, all under Brigadier Staveley. This was followed by the 2d Infantry Brigade, two 9-pounder Batteries, and a Rocket Battery, succeeded by the main column of the French.
On approaching the entrenched camp, the Tartar Cavalry moved rapidly down to attack Sir Robert Napier, who was at this time about two and a half miles off, on my right flank. His report of that part of the engagement I beg to enclose.
Sir John Michel's Division deployed at the same time in front of the enemy's works, and opened fire with Lieutenant-Colonel Barry's Armstrong Battery and Captain Desborough's 9-pounders, a French Battery being on the left together with a French and an English Rocket Battery. These guns kept up such a heavy fire that the Tartars were unable to resist long, and they abandoned their works, being closely followed into their second entrenched line at Sin-ho, which they were unable to defend, and fled to Tang-ku.
I enclose Sir J. Michel's report of this affair.
The enemy's force was composed principally of cavalry, and numbered about 4,000 men. At Sin-ho I was joined by Sir R. Napier's Division and the cavalry, who had cut up a good number of the Tartar horsemen.
The loss of the Chinese was about 100 men.
On the 13th I reconnoitred the ground along the banks of the Peiho leading to Tang-ku, and found it tolerably firm, though intersected with creeks and ditches. I ordered these to be bridged during the night, and on the morning of the 14th an Allied Force moved from Sin-ho towards Tang-ku, keeping their right flank on the bank of the river. The English part of the force consisted of the 1st Infantry Division under Sir John Michel, and the Artillery, as per margin, which formed one grand battery under Brigadier-General Crofton, R.A.
On arriving within a mile of Tang-ku, a battery and some junks on the right bank were silenced by two Armstrong and two 9-pounder guns; and a party of sailors who had been brought up for the purpose crossed the river and burned the junks.
The whole of the Artillery was then advanced to within 600 yards of the entrenchment, and opened a heavy fire on the walls—two French batteries deployed on our left—the enemy replying with 10 or 12 guns and a brisk fire of gingalls and matchlocks. The Artillery gradually advanced to within 350 yards, and the enemy's guns being silenced, a breach was commenced, when a passage across the double wet ditch was discovered at the river's edge by the 60th Rifles and an entrance was effected, the Chinese retiring with great precipitancy. At the same time the French advanced with great gallantry and entered by the main gate, which had been partially broken in by the Artillery fire. The garrison of Tang-ku retreated, some into the North Forts and some across the river to Tang-ku.
I am happy to say that our losses in these two engagements were very slight, owing to the enemy being completely paralyzed by the superior fire of our Artillery.
45 guns were captured in Tang-ku. My thanks are due to Major-Generals Sir John Michel and Sir R. Napier, commanding divisions (the former had a horse killed under him on the 14th), also to Brigadier-General Crofton, commanding Royal Artillery, and Brigadier Pattle, commanding the Cavalry, for the able way in which they exercised their respective commands; and the whole of the officers and soldiers acquitted themselves to my satisfaction.
I beg to enclose a list of casualties.
The Right Honourable
(Signed)
The Secretary of State for War.
I have, &c.
J. HOPE GRANT, Lieut.-Gen., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China.
## DESPATCH from Major-General Sir R. NAPIER to Sir J. HOPE GRANT.
SIR,
Camp, Tang-ku, August 24, 1860.
I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the result of the operations of the force under my command, employed in the advance from Peh-tang, and the attack of the Tartar post at the Sin-ho entrenchment.
The troops left their billets at 4 A.M. of the 12th instant, and moved out in the following order: --
An advanced guard of 200 men of the 3d Buffs, with two Armstrong guns of Milward's Battery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent, 3d Buffs.
4 Armstrong guns, Milward's Battery.
23d Company Royal Engineers.
3d Buffs.
8th Regiment Punjaub Infantry.
44th Regiment.
Rotton's Rocket Battery.
Royal Marines.
Madras Sappers and Miners.
Right Wing 67th Regiment. Reserve Ammunition.
Hospital Stretchers, &c. Rear-guard.
Left Wing 67th Regiment.
CAVALRY BRIGADE.
2 Squadrons King's Dragoon Guards. Probyn's Horse.
3 guns, Stirling's Battery. Fane's Horse.
The head of the column moved at 4 A.M., but though two days' hard work had been devoted to repairing the roads, the deep tenacious mud rendered them so difficult that it was not till half-past seven that the rear of the column cleared the gate of Peh-tang.
According to his Excellency's instructions, the force above enumerated struck off from the causeway by a track to the right, at half a mile from Peh-tang. The Commander-in-Chief was himself a witness of the extreme difficulties which had to be overcome in extricating the troops from the inundated town of Peh-tang, and advancing them through the deep mud, in which gun-wheels frequently were imbedded axle-deep. It cost two hours' hard labour to the troops to traverse the first two miles.
I advanced by brigades in line of contiguous columns at quarter-distance, my front covered by the advanced guard of 200 3d Buffs and Milward's Battery, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent. The cavalry was formed on my right.
A considerable halt was necessary to enable the rear to struggle through the heavy ground, and close up, for I was aware that I was liable to attack from the north as well as from the enemy in front.
Observing the approach of the allied columns to the direct attack of the entrenchment upon the causeway, and perceiving the enemy in great force, both in that entrenchment and in front of the village of Sin ho, I marched directly towards them, taking their position in flank, and threatening their line of retreat.
On arriving within 1,500 yards, Milward's Armstrong guns opened on the enemy. These were the first shots fired with that weapon in war, and the range and accuracy of their fire excited the admiration of the force. The Tartar horsemen were surprised by the fire, but not shaken. After some hesitation they streamed out in a long line through a passage across the marsh which separated us, and forming with great regularity and quickness, enveloped my force in a great circle of skirmishers. The northern portion formed by the Cavalry, known to be in that direction, who hitherto kept out of sight, seemed suddenly to rise in position from the plain.
As soon as the enemy's movements were clearly defined, I sent to Brigadier Pattle, commanding the Cavalry, directing him to detach a troop to protect my right rear, and to take the opportunity to charge, which the enemy so boldly offered him.
I then had the satisfaction of seeing the admirable charge of my Cavalry, by which the Tartar horde, in front of them, was driven from the field in disorder. Milward's Battery
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Advance on Sin-ho and Capture of Tang-ku.
DESPATCH from Sir HOPE GRANT to Mr. Secretary HERBERT.
(No. 37.)
SIR,
Head Quarters, Tang-ku,* August 24, 1860. I HAVE the honour to report that the Allied Forces were unable to leave Peh-tang until the 12th August, on account of the very heavy rain, which had made the country almost impassable.
On that morning, however, the troops marched according to the following dispositions, viz., the 2d Division of Infantry, an Armstrong Battery, a Rocket Battery, Madras Sap- pers, and the Cavalry Brigade, with three 6-pounders. The whole under Major-General Sir Robert Napier struck off to the right of the road leading from Peh-tang to Sin-ho, for the purpose of turning the left of the Tartar position. This column experienced the greatest difficulty in getting through the deep heavy ground, which extended for more than two miles out of Peh-tang, and considerably delayed the departure of the main column, under Sir John Michel, which moved along the causeway leading directly from Peh-tang to Sin-ho, and which was composed as follows, viz., the 1st Infantry Brigade, a company of Royal Engineers, an Armstrong Battery, 1,000 French Infantry, and a French Battery, all under Brigadier Staveley. This was followed by the 2d Infantry Brigade, two 9-pounder Batteries, and a Rocket Battery, succeeded by the main column of the French.
On approaching the entrenched camp, the Tartar Cavalry moved rapidly down to attack Sir Robert Napier, who was at this time about two and a half miles off, on my right flank. His report of that part of the engagement I beg to enclose.
Sir John Michel's Division deployed at the same time in front of the enemy's works, and opened fire with Lieutenant-Colonel Barry's Armstrong Battery and Captain Des- borough's 9-pounders, a French Battery being on the left together with a French and an English Rocket Battery. These guns kept up such a heavy fire that the Tartars were unable to resist long, and they abandoned their works, being closely followed into their second entrenched line at Sin-ho, which they were unable to defend, and fled to Tang-ku.
I enclose Sir J. Michel's report of this affair.
The enemy's force was composed principally of cavalry, and numbered about 4,000 men. At Sin-ho I was joined by Sir R. Napier's Division and the cavalry, who had cut up a good number of the Tartar horsemen."
The loss of the Chinese was about 100 men.
On the 13th I reconnoitred the ground along the banks of the Peiho leading to Tang-ku, and found it tolerably firm, though intersected with creeks and ditches. I ordered these to be bridged during the night, and on the morning of the 14th an Allied Force moved from Sin-ho towards Tang-ku, keeping their right flank on the bank of the river. The English part of the force consisted of the 1st Infantry Division under Sir John Michel, and the Artillery, as per margin, which formed one grand battery under Brigadier-General Crofton, R.A.
On arriving within a mile of Tang-ku, a battery and some junks on the right bank were silenced by two Armstrong and two 9-pounder guns; and a party of sailors who had been brought up for the purpose crossed the river and burned the junks.
The whole of the Artillery was then advanced to within 600 yards of the entrench- ment, and opened a heavy fire on the walls-two French batteries deployed on our left- the enemy replying with 10 or 12 guns and a brisk fire of gingalls and matchlocks. The Artillery gradually advanced to within 350 yards, and the enemy's guns being silenced, a breach was commenced, when a passage across the double wet ditch was discovered at the river's edge by the 60th Rifles and an entrance was effected, the Chinese retiring with great precipitancy. At the same time the French advanced with great gallantry and entered by the main gate, which had been partially broken in by the Artillery fire. The garrison of Tang-ku retreated, some into the North Forts and some across the river to Tang-ku.
I am happy to say that our losses in these two engagements were very slight, owing to the enemy being completely paralyzed by the superior fire of our Artillery.
45 guns were captured in Tang-ku. My thanks are due to Major-Generals Sir John Michel and Sir R. Napier, commanding divisions (the former had a horse killed under him on the 14th), also to Brigadier-General Crofton, commanding Royal Artillery, and
• Spelled Teng-ku on Capt. Brabazon's Map.
↑ Two Armstrong batteries, two 9-pounder batteries, two rocket batteries.
Brigadier Pattle, commanding the Cavalry, for the able way in which they exercised their respective commands; and the whole of the officers and soldiers acquitted them- selves to my satisfaction.
I beg to enclose a list of casualties.
The Right Honourable
(Signed)
The Secretary of State for War.
I have, &c.
J. HOPE GRANT, Lieut.-Gen., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China.
DESPATCH from Major-General Sir R. NAPIER to Sir J. HOPE GRANT. SIR,
Camp, Tang-ku, August 24, 1860. I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander- in-Chief, the result of the operations of the force under my command, employed in the advance from Pch-tang, and the attack of the Tartar post at the Sin-ho entrenchment.
The troops left their billets at 4 A.M. of the 12th instant, and moved out in the follow- ing order: --
An advanced guard of 200 men of the 3d Buffs, with two Armstrong guns of Milward's Battery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent, 3d Buffs.
4 Armstrong guns, Milwards's Battery.
23d Company Royal Engineers.
3d Butts.
8th Regiment Punjaub Infantry.
44th Regiment.
Rolton's Rocket Battery.
Royal Marines.
Madras Sappers and Miners.
Right Wing 67th Regiment. Reserve Ammunition.
Hospital Stretchers, &c. Rear-guard.
Left Wing 67th Regiment.
CAVALRY BRIGADE.
2 Squadrons King's Dragoon Guards. Probyn's Ilorse.
3 guns, Stirling's Battery. Fane's Horse.
The head of the column moved at 4 A.M., but though two days' hard work had been devoted to repairing the roads, the deep tenacious mud rendered them so difficult that it was not till half-past seven that the rear of the column cleared the gate of Peh-tang.
According to his Excellency's instructions, the force above enumerated struck off from the causeway by a track to the right, at half a mile from Peh-tang. The Commander-in- Chief was himself a witness of the extreme difficulties which had to be overcome in ex- tricating the troops from the inundated town of Peh-tang, and advancing them through the deep mud, in which gun-wheels frequently were imbedded axle-deep. It cost two hours' hard labour to the troops to traverse the first two miles.
I advanced by brigades in line of contiguous columns at quarter-distance, my front covered by the advanced guard of 200 3d Buffs and Milward's Battery, under coinmand of Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent. The cavalry was formed on my right.
A considerable halt was necessary to enable the rear to struggle through the heavy ground, and close up, for I was aware that I was liable to attack from the north as well as from the enemy in front.
Observing the approach of the allied columns to the direct attack of the entrenchment upon the causeway, and perceiving the enemy in great force, both in that entrenchment and in front of the village of Sin ho, I marched directly towards them, taking their position in flank, and threatening their line of retreat.
On arriving within 1,500 yards, Milward's Armstrong guns opened on the enemy. These were the first shots fired with that weapon in war, and the range and accuracy of their fire excited the admiration of the force. The Tartar horsemen were surprised by the fire, but not shaken. After some hesitation they streamned out in a long line through a passage across the marsh which separated us, and forming with great regularity and quickness, enveloped my force in a great circle of skirmishers. The northern portion formed by the Cavalry, known to be in that direction, who hitherto kept out of sight, seemed suddenly to rise in position from the plain.
As soon as the enemy's movements were clearly defined, I sent to Brigadier Pattle, commanding the Cavalry, directing him to detach a troop to protect my right rear, and to take the opportunity to charge, which the enemy so boldly offered himi.
I then had the satisfaction of seeing the admirable charge of my Cavalry, by which the Tartar horde, in front of them, was driven from the field in disorder. Milward's Battery
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